This is a precis of an article in History Today (2008) by Clive Pearson, who was Lecturer in History at Gloucestershire College.
Summary Stalin's war leadership was a mix of failures and successes. Stalin had left his Army purged and poorly-equpped, and he relied too much on the Nazi-Soviet Pact to protect Russia. His mistakes in 1941 and 1942 led to devastating losses, and his draconian discipline damaged morale. By the end of August 1942 Stalin at last realised that he had to change. He appointed General Zhukov as his Deputy, and made decisions in consultation with Army Command. These changes turned the tide in 1943 and, coupled with effective economic mobilization and diplomatic skill, ultimately led to Soviet victory in the Great Patriotic War.
Stalin as War Leader
Josef Stalin, as the leader of a highly centralized dictatorship, played a crucial role in every aspect of the Soviet war effort during the Great Patriotic War (1941-45). Consequently, he was directly responsible for the war's progression and its outcome. At the end of this massive conflict, he presented himself as a war hero. However, Stalin's leadership had both failures and successes. He allowed Hitler to surprise him in June 1941, continued with ineffective military strategies for too long, but also made key decisions that eventually led to Soviet victory.
The Pre-war PeriodThe Soviet elite believed war with capitalist powers was inevitable. This belief drove Stalin's rapid industrialization through Five Year Plans, making the Soviet economy comparable to other great European powers by 1941. However, the military was unprepared. Stalin's purges of military commanders in 1937-8 had undermined morale and initiative, and Soviet forces lacked essential equipment for modern warfare. Stalin placed too much reliance on the Nazi-Soviet Pact of August 1939, believing he had outsmarted Hitler and bought time. However, Hitler’s swift victories in the West quickly threatened the Soviet Union. He even abandoned the old defensive line, the Stalin line, which had run along the previous Soviet frontier and moved up to the new frontier in Poland. By 1941, Soviet defences were not ready, and Stalin misjudged Hitler’s intentions, hoping for more time. He ignored numerous warnings, including Britain, Japan and inside the German Air Ministry, that Hitler was preparing a June attack. When the Nazi attack came on June 22, 1941, Soviet forces were unprepared, leading to disastrous initial losses.
Phase One - DisasterStalin’s refusal to mobilize Soviet forces in time led to catastrophic defeats when the Nazis attacked. Many Soviet units were overrun, and Stalin's central and northern defences crumbled as he had concentrated forces in the south. Despite these setbacks, Stalin maintained control and re-established military command structures, showing determination. However, Stalin’s war strategies, based on outdated Civil War experiences, proved ineffective against Nazi Blitzkrieg tactics. His inflexible command led to further disasters, such as the massive Soviet losses at Kiev. Stalin’s methods, including harsh discipline and severe penalties for failure, stifled initiative and demoralized troops. The Soviet situation improved slightly when winter halted the Nazi advance near Moscow. Stalin stayed in Moscow, rallying his forces and launching a counter-attack that pushed the Germans back. This moment marked a turning point, showing the potential of Soviet commanders like Zhukov when given some flexibility. Despite the victory at Moscow, Stalin’s strategy remained flawed, leading to more defeats in 1942. German forces advanced towards the Caucasus, and Soviet troops, demoralized by constant losses, struggled to resist. Pearson comments: "Why had Stalin continued with his failed strategy for so long? The main reason was undoubtedly that he was out of touch with modern warfare, but his former stance had also suited his system of rule. Pride and arrogance were also fundamental reasons: to change policy meant loss of face and the necessity of sharing power with his generals".
Phase Two – Soviet Counter-AttackBy late 1942, Stalin realized his command system needed change. He appointed Zhukov as his deputy and involved Stavka (Soviet Army High Command) – including capable generals such as Aleksandr Vasilevsky his chief of staff, and Aleksei Antonov his chief of operations – in strategic planning. This shift allowed for more flexible and collegiate decision-making and marked the beginning of Soviet successes. The Battle of Stalingrad was a decisive turning point. Instead of attacking immediately, Zhukov and others prepared a well-timed counter-attack, encircling and defeating German forces. This victory boosted Soviet morale and marked the start of a successful strategy. Further Soviet offensives, though initially limited in success, gradually wore down German forces. The Battle of Kursk in July 1943 was another significant victory. Soviet forces, prepared with deep defensive lines, repelled the German attack and launched a successful counter-offensive. Stalin also made significant organizational changes. He reduced the powers of political commissars and stopped executing commanders for failures, promoting greater self-reliance and flexibility. The reorganization of the Soviet army and air force to focus on fast-moving, mechanized units helped match the Wehrmacht’s capabilities.
Phase Three – Soviet VictoryFrom mid-1943 to the end of the war in May 1945, Stalin evolved into a competent military commander. He shared strategic decisions with his generals, leading to well-coordinated Soviet offensives. The liberation of Kiev in November 1943 and subsequent victories highlighted Soviet progress. In 1944, Stalin's "ten crushing blows", starting wth the relief of Leningrad, significantly weakened German forces. Operation Bagration in June 1944 was particularly successful, driving German forces out of Soviet territory and into Eastern Europe. Stalin's strategic coordination was crucial in these operations. As Soviet forces approached Berlin, Stalin took direct control of operations, fearing Western Allies might reach the city first. The final assault on Berlin, though costly, resulted in German surrender on May 2, 1945. Stalin emerged as a victorious war leader, though his leadership style led to immense Soviet losses.
Total WarStalin understood the importance of economic strength in warfare. He ordered the relocation of factories and workers eastward, beyond the Ural Mountains, ensuring continuous production of war materials. By mid-1942, Soviet industry out-produced German industry, contributing to military successes. Stalin also mobilized the entire Soviet population, including women and Gulag prisoners, for the war effort. His exploitation of Western Allies through the Lend-Lease scheme provided vital supplies, such as trucks and communication equipment, enhancing Soviet military capabilities. As a diplomat, Stalin skilfully managed relations with Western Allies, particularly at the Teheran and Yalta conferences. He exploited divisions between Churchill and Roosevelt to secure Soviet interests, particularly in Eastern Europe.
ConclusionPearson concludes: "Stalin was indeed crucial in winning the war for the Soviet Union. He had a decisive role in the centre co-ordinating military and economic strategy. Through his secure grip on the government, party apparatus and the economy he was able to avoid collapse and turn defeat into triumph. He was under no delusions as to what would be required to survive in modern warfare. Total war was a concept he had learned in the early years of Soviet power under Lenin. American diplomat Averill Harriman thought Stalin ‘the most effective of the war leaders’. As supreme military commander he was flexible and able to adapt to circumstances. He built up a team of remarkable quality in Stavka and used them to help win the war. He learned from them and developed as commander himself. At Teheran the British chief of the Imperial General Staff, General Sir Alan Brooke, was impressed and thought Stalin had a ‘brain of the highest military calibre’. Yet for all this Stalin’s legacy was far from heroic. His self-deception with regard to the timing of the Nazi attack nearly resulted in catastrophic defeat. His incompetent handling of Soviet forces in the first 14 months of the war had tragic consequences. All this meant that losses were far heavier than they need have been. A relieved Stalin might savour his victory celebrations – but 27 million Soviet war dead could not". |
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