1 The Causes of War
A Introduction
`The most important thing about the First World War is that it
was the unsought, unintended product of a long sequence of
events which began in 1871' (Thomson). Looking back on
events there is a tendency to feel that all was lost once Europe
was divided into the two basic alliance blocks, but as A.J.P. Taylor points
out there was considerable diplomatic manoeuvre both in and between the blocks.
B For some years, even after 1907, Britain was as worried about
Russian activity in Persia as she was about German naval
expansion, and approaches continued between England and
Germany for some kind of agreement up to 1912. Even France
made approaches to Germany until French feeling and policy
hardened under Poincare and the second Moroccan Crisis
(1911) strengthened French opposition to Germany. Russia, although she
clashed with Austria, had no direct quarrel with Germany until the Kaiser became
involved in German expansion in the Turkish Empire and the Middle East.
C Three major problems tended to harden the relations between
the rival blocks and at the same time to tie the allied nations
closer together. Events in the Balkans and in the Turkish
Empire drove Russia and Germany farther apart and tied
Austria and Germany more tightly together. The Moroccan
crises hardened anti-German feeling in France and brought
England and France closer together. The naval rivalry between England
and Germany broke down repeated attempts to secure an Anglo-German agreement to
limit armaments and bound England more closely to the Triple Entente.
2 Events Leading to War
A The Balkan Crisis of 1908
i A revolt in Serbia, in 1903, replaced the pro-Austrian King
Alexander by a pro-Russian ruler, King Peter Karageorgovic. Austria took no immediate action but, always worried by the
`threat' from Serbia, she planned in 1906 to counter the Serbs
by taking over complete control of Bosnia and Herzegovina
which had been under Austria's care since 1878. Her opportunity came in
1908 when the revolt of the Young Turks disrupted the government of the Turkish
Empire.
ii Austria therefore annexed Bosnia and Herzegovina in 1908. Serbia protested and Russia supported Serbia. Germany gave
Austria complete backing. Moltke, Chief of the German General Staff,
wrote to Conrad, the Chief of the Austrian military staff, 'The moment Russia
mobilizes, Germany will also mobilize, and will unquestionably mobilize her
whole army.' Since neither France nor England were willing to give active
support, Russia had to climb down.
iii The Austro-German alliance had scored a great diplomatic
success, but as with other German diplomatic adventures the
results took a surprising turn. Austria had weakened her position by intensifying German-Slav rivalry and by increasing the
hostility of Serbia on her southern frontier. Germany had
failed to weaken the Triple Entente and found herself committed to unconditional support for Austria in the Balkans. Russia learnt a double lesson. She moved closer to France and
set about strengthening her armed forces. No wonder Bulow when he
retired as German Foreign Minister is alleged to have said to Kaiser William II
in 1909, 'Do not repeat the Bosnian affair' (Taylor).
B The Moroccan Crisis - The Panther at Agadir, 1911
i In May 1911, the French occupied Fez, the capital of Morocco,
following disorder in the country. Though supported by the Sultan of
Morocco France had gone beyond the terms agreed at Algeciras and it looked as if
the French would take full control of Morocco.
ii Kiderlen, the German foreign minister, felt that Germany
should get some compensation if France took Morocco, and
thinking that France was temporarily isolated since both her
partners had recently been negotiating with Germany about
affairs in Persia, he decided to wield 'the big stick' to back up
his bargaining. The German gunboat, the Panther, was therefore sent to
Agadir and anchored there on July 1, 1911.
iii The whole situation now changed. Whichever French politicians had been prepared to bargain they could not take the
Panther episode lying down. Lloyd George's speech at the Mansion House, declaring that Britain would not accept a peace
which meant sacrificing her national interests, was read by the
French and German public as full backing for France. The
British fleet prepared for action. By the autumn of 1911, the Germans
had to accept a face-saving compromise: territory in the Congo as compensation.
iv The second Moroccan crisis which had started as an effort to
negotiate a bargain and effect some reconciliation with France,
ended by hardening Franco-German hostility and by strengthening the Triple Entente instead of weakening it.
Caillaux, the French minister with pro-German inclinations, was driven from
power and replaced by Poincare (1912) who was from Lorraine and had never
forgotten the defeat of 1871.
v Germany was humiliated. Prince von Bulow summed up the
German viewpoint of Agadir, 'It started like a damp squib, it
startled, then amused the world and ended by making us look
ridiculous.' Kiderlen was denounced in the Reichstag for his
weakness. A new Navy Law authorised in October 1912 put
Germany on a programme of three dreadnoughts per year
instead of two, and the expansion of her already powerful army
was discussed. 'The conflicts of 1905 and 1909 had been crises of
diplomacy; in 1911 nations faced each other in a pre-war spirit' (Taylor).
C Anglo-German Naval Rivalry
i Germany as a great land power stood behind her army. Britain
as a world sea power stood behind her navy. Once Germany
seriously challenged Britain's naval power, there was always
the fear, not only in British minds, that Germany was seeking
world domination. 'It was of decisive importance that Britain and
Germany — the greatest world power and the greatest European power — were now
competing for supremacy at sea' (Thomson).
ii Germany began with the Navy Laws of 1897 and 1898, which
added twelve battleships to the existing seven, together with
major increases in the number of large and small cruisers. In
1900, her naval programme planned to double her existing
battleships and clearly pointed German ambitions towards
world sea-power. In 1903, Britain took up the challenge with
the new naval base at Rosyth and approval was given by
Parliament for the formation of a North Sea fleet. In 1905,
Britain started to build dreadnoughts and Germany quickly
followed her example. English proposals to cut down the naval race were
repeatedly brushed aside by the Kaiser and, after 1907, such requests became
doubly suspect.
iii Agadir raised the naval problem again in acute form, and when
Lord Haldane's mission of friendship to Berlin in February
1912 foundered on the German Navy Law of that year, Britain
introduced a new and greater naval programme and made
arrangements with the French by which French naval forces
were concentrated in the Mediterranean and British naval
forces in the North Sea. The naval race upset repeated attempts
by Britain to come to some general agreement with Germany. It was significant that Lord Haldane's attempt was the last.
It had, however, the opposite effect on Anglo-French relations by binding the
two countries more closely together.
iv The naval race was only one aspect of the general build-up of
armaments. In 1913, France raised her period of compulsory
military service from two years to three, and the Russians
extended their military service from three to three and a half
years. The German army, also enlarged, was building up to a force of
five million men.
v Between 1912 and 1914 the two rival alliances were feverishly
building up all the arms for war. The nations of Europe were
organized into two tight groups with no bridge between them. `There could scarcely have been worse conditions for either
peace or war. The equilibrium was so delicate that a puff of wind
might destroy it' (J.A. Spender, quoted by Thomson).
D The Balkan Wars, 1912-13
i The Balkan Wars finished in August 1913 just
twelve months before the outbreak of the First World War and
their influence on the overall European situation was very
important. The emergence of a much larger Serbia frightened
Austria and a quick war seemed to the Austrian government the
only way to ward off the Serbian threat. In October 1913, when
the Serbs moved into Albania to restore order on the frontier,
Austria demanded their withdrawal within a week and Kaiser
William II told the Austrian Minister, Berchtold, 'You can be
certain I stand behind you and am ready to draw the sword
whenever your action makes it necessary' (Taylor). This was the green
light for Austria.
ii The Balkan Wars weakened the Turkish Empire and gave
Germany an opening to become dominant at the Straits. Constantinople could be the spearhead of German economic
expansion and railway penetration into the Middle East. 'The temptation
was irresistible and indeed if Germany were to continue on her course as a Great
Power, unavoidable' (Taylor).
iii Russia had also a vital interest in the Straits. Southern Russia
depended on a free passage through the Straits for her export
trade in general and for her corn trade in particular. The last
thing that Russia wanted to see was a foreign power such as
Germany established in Constantinople. This explains her
vigorous protest in November 1913, when a German General,
Liman von Sanders, was put in charge of the Turkish army
and given command of Constantinople. The Russians backed by France and
Britain persuaded the Germans to remove him.
iv The net result of the Balkan wars was to underline harshly in the
area of the Balkans and the Turkish Empire, the basic conflict
between Pan-German aims as represented by Austria and
Germany, and Pan-Slav aims as represented by Russia and
Serbia. This was the more dangerous at a time when Germany had promised
unconditional support for Austria, while France, more confident than at any time
since 1871, was more ready to back Russia, even in the Balkans where she had no
direct interest.
v As a final ironic touch the speed with which the Balkan states
had won their war against Turkey was noted. The major powers on the
continent thought in terms of a similar lightning war, and made preparations for
it.
E The Assassination of Archduke Ferdinand at Sarajevo, June 28,1914
i The powder-keg was already full. The assassination of Archduke Ferdinand, heir to the Austrian throne, put the match to
it by giving Austria the opportunity she was determined to take,
of crushing Serbia in war. The Austrian ultimatum sent to
Serbia (July 23) was followed within five days by a declaration
of war against Serbia in spite of the conciliatory answer given
by the Serbs. The Russians had advised the Serbs not to resist
but to depend on action by the Great Powers. Grey for the British
government tried to mediate.
ii The Austrians were determined on war and the Germans made
no effort to stop them. Russian general mobilization (July 30) was followed by German mobilization. Germany declared war
on Russia (August 1) and on France (August 3). The German
ultimatum to Belgium, demanding free passage for German
troops through Belgium, brought in Britain on August 4, 1914. Only a week
was needed to declare a war which lasted four years.
Questions
1. Outline the chief events leading
to the First World War from 1907 to 1914. 2. How far would you consider Austria and Germany to be
responsible for the War of 1914-18 ?
3. Show how events in (a) Morocco,
and (b) the Balkans, contributed to the outbreak of war in 1914.
4. What importance would you give to (a) naval rivalry, and (b) general rearmament, as factors leading to war in 1914?
5. Show the importance of each of the following:
The German Navy Laws - Bosnia and Herzegovina - The Panther - The Balkan Wars -
Sarajevo. |