How stable was the Weimar Republic?
In the first of
a new series, profiling the issues raised by key A-level
quetsions, Gareth Affleck identifies the points to discuss
This question, frequently
asked, is a vital one for any student studying the period.
Answering it requires both looking back at the
circumstances surrounding the establishment of the
Republic, and forward to a consideration of the reasons
for its failure. Of course within the constraints of an
exam essay, or even within a two-page article, a
comprehensive answer is impossible. This article is
intended both to provide a brief answer to the question
and to illustrate how a good A-level student approached
this essay.
Introduction
The years 1924-9 in Weimar
Germany present one of the most tantalising 'might have
beens' in history. In this period the Republic prospered
economically, politically and in its foreign policy, and
it is tempting to conclude that but for the intervention
of the Great Depression of the 1930s Germany would have
developed into a stable parliamentary democracy, and the
horrors of Hitler might have been avoided. However a
closer examination of the situation reveals otherwise, as
this student believes:
The Weimar Republic was
seen to be in a period of stability between 1924 and
1929. It was not only Germans that noticed that this
was a high point for the Weimar Republic. William
Shirer, an American journalist writes 'A wonderful
ferment was working in Germany. Life seemed more free,
more modern, more exciting than in any place I had
ever seen'. Indeed it did seem as if the German
economy was beginning to heal itself. Political
recovery and apparent success in foreign affairs
strengthened the belief that the Weimar Republic and
Germany were becoming stable at last. However, as the
Weimar Republic disintegrated almost as soon as the
world depression fell, this so-called stability has
been questioned. In comparison to the years before and
after, this period was stable. Nevertheless,
historians now agree that both political and economic
recovery in Germany, and healthier foreign affairs,
were all built on 'unstable foundations'. It is even
thought that conditions were so bad by 1929 that the
Weimar Republic may have soon collapsed without the
onset of world depression.
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Whilst the last sentence of
this introduction perhaps overstates the situation, it
probably is the case that Weimar Germany would have faced
severe economic and political difficulties even without
the world depression.
Economic stability?
The link between the health
of the Republic and its economy is striking. It is no
surprise that the Republic faced its most serious
difficulties in times of economic hardship. There is an
ongoing debate amongst economic historians concerning the
strength of the economy in 1929, and lack of space
precludes a detailed discussion here, but nevertheless the
student is able to draw some general conclusions:
The stabilisation of
German currency and the introduction of the Dawes plan
in 1924 brought economic growth and affluence. The
plan rescheduled German reparations according to her
capacity to pay them. She was also granted a large
American loan, and the plan also led to the evacuation
of the Ruhr by French troops. Germany seemed to make a
remarkable economic recovery in this period. In 1928
Gilbert Parker, an American financier reported:
'German business conditions appear to have righted
themselves on a relatively high level of activity'.
With regards to industry, Germany experienced boom
conditions in this period. Iron, steel, coal the heavy
industries managed to equal and sometimes even exceed
export and out-put levels of 1913. This occurred
through greater efficiency and improved technology,
which brought about higher levels of productivity.
This economic progress in Germany also led to
increased wages. A social welfare scheme was
introduced including pensions and sick benefits, which
gave support to the feeling that the economy was
recovering and the Republic was becoming more stable.
However, this
recovery was not as real as it seems to be at face
value. In 1926 production declined, and Germany's
balance of trade was in the red. Unemployment was
never below 1.3 million and was especially bad in the
agricultural sectors. Unfortunately world conditions
did not favour Germany, who depended on her exports,
at a time when world trade was not high. However the
most important factor in German stability was that
Germany's economic well-being was dependent on and
vulnerable to 'the investment whims of foreign
capital'. The German government wanted to balance the
budget, they wanted to boost the economy and they took
on large social welfare schemes. Of course there was
also the question of reparations payments. Therefore
she was forced to rely on international loans
generally from America. So, the 'recovery' of
Germany's economy was only 'a false image of
prosperity' (Layton). Her economy could not possibly
be stable when it was tied so tightly to external
forces beyond her control.
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The high cost of Germany's
social welfare programme, declining exports (as a
percentage of GDP), lack of internal investment,
reparations payments and rising unemployment were merely
concealed by the high levels of borrowing from abroad.
Whilst it would be unfair to say that Germany's economy
would have collapsed anyway, even without the world
depression Germany was facing an economic crisis by 1929.
Political stability?
The Weimar Republic's
greatest weakness throughout its history was its failure
to establish lasting political stability. From the
disastrous association with Versailles, the 'stab in the
back' and the 'November Criminals' at its creation, to the
turmoil of its last years, the period 1924-9 stands out as
a time when a stable political system seemed to be
developing. However, not only was this stability unable to
resist the effects of depression in the 1930s, its very
existence was something of an illusion, as this student
points out:
There not only seemed to
be an economic recovery between 1924 and 1929 but it
also seemed as if some form of political recovery was
underway. The election results of this period gave
people grounds to believe the long term survival of
Weimar was a strong possibility. There was a notable
decline of support for the extremist right and left
wing parties. In comparison the parties sympathetic to
the Republic gained seats, as in the case of the
Social Democrats who held the majority 153 seats.
Carr, however, rightly calls this an 'illusion'. He
says 'Superficial prosperity and the growing
international stature of the republic served to mask a
state of chronic political weakness'. There was no
progress made in the parliamentary and political
system: the coalition governments did not enhance the
credit of party politics in Germany, where the
foundations of democracy were insecure. Their
disagreements over trivialities such as the issue of
the national flag or the creation of denominational
schools only showed that 'there was no effective
consolidation nor any significant sign of political
maturation in particular the main democratic parties
had still not recognised the vital necessity of
working together in a spirit of compromise' (Layton).
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The political system was
undoubtedly weak in 1929. It had failed to establish
itself in the hearts of the people, and this failure was
not the fault of the constitution, as is often claimed,
but of the politicians: they failed to capitalise on the
opportunities offered by economic prosperity to establish
democratic values strong enough to resist future crises.
America suffered comparably to Germany in the depression
of the Thirties, but its political system was never under
threat. Germany's political system in contrast succumbed
quickly even before the advent of Hitler, democracy was
effectively dead with the appointment of Brüning's
presidential government in 1930.
Foreign Policy
It is in the field of
foreign policy that Weimar seemed to make the most
progress in this period, yet even here the work of
Stresemann, often hailed as the man who could have saved
Weimar, had drawbacks:
Stresemann's main aim was
to bring about a revision of the Treaty of Versailles.
The Dawes Plan of 1924 and the Locarno Treaties of
1925 were seen to be diplomatic successes for
Stresemann, who 'achieved a great deal... at very
little cost' (Layton). Germany joined the League of
Nations and the Kellog-Briand Pact was subscribed to.
Pacts and Treaties such as these, including the Treaty
of Berlin with Russia and reduced reparations in the
Young Plan, led Germany to believe she was no longer
the 'ogre' of Europe. However Layton aptly states 'His
achievement was indeed considerable though by 1929 his
policy had not lasted long enough or gone far enough
to establish a momentum that could survive the very
different circumstances of the 1930s'.
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The problem with
Stresemann's policy of revision was that by 1929 it had
seemed to reach a dead end, and he himself was
disappointed by its limits. There was a growing feeling
inside Germany that a more dynamic approach was required.
Certainly one of Hitler's most powerful attractions was
his promise to overthrow the Versailles Treaty, and he won
genuine popularity for his moves in this direction in the
1930s.
Conclusion
It should be obvious by now
that the most that can be claimed for the Weimar Republic
by 1929 is 'relative stability' in neither economic,
political or foreign affairs had sufficient progress been
made to enable the republic to withstand the coming storm:
By 1929 neither the
economy nor the political system were stable.
Prosperity in Germany was based on large international
loans, and the economy was facing severe internal
structural problems. There was no sign of political
maturation by 1929. The parties had not learned to
work together for the good of the country. In 1929
with the death of Stresemann came the end of stability
in foreign affairs. Therefore by 1929 the Weimar
Republic was not stable.
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The importance of this
conclusion should be obvious to those studying the rise of
Hitler: the Great Depression cannot take all the blame.
